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This article considers military security 
in the Eastern Baltic. The research focuses 
on the economic sustainability of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania in the context of mili-
tary spending. The authors maintain that an 
increase in military spending can either 
strengthen or weaken national economic 
and technological potential. In Germany or 
Sweden, military spending accounts for a 
smaller proportion of the GDP or budget re-
venues, but it is integrated into the general 
model of innovative and technological deve-
lopment. In the case of the Baltics, it is ad-
visable to estimate military spending as a 
proportion of budget revenues rather than 
that of GDP — this recommendation applies 
to all smaller states. The authors stress that 
the central component of any national mili-
tary and economic development is a focus 
on general national objectives rather than 
solely military ones. Economically advanced 
countries integrate defence spending into 
their investment and innovation strategies 
and industrial policies. Smaller countries — 
and the Baltics are no exception — do not 
apply this principle. Their military spending 
does not contribute to the technological and 
economic agenda. The article shows that the 
military spending of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia undermines their investment poten-
tial and serves as a critical factor in their 
national and governmental development. 
The authors suggest estimating military 
spending as a proportion of budget revenues 
rather than that of GDP. 
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Introduction 
 
The assessment of security problems 
is not an exclusive task of international 
relation, regional studies, and military 
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analysts. In a geographically small but politically significant region of the 
Baltic Sea, any military preparations should naturally be linked to the ob-
jective economic capacities of the state. 
Imbalanced military expenditures can threaten the country's security 
no less than external threats. In the understanding of this circumstance, 
the expert and scientific community of Russia relies on the relatively re-
cent Soviet experience. 
The military spending growth is specific for the majority of the lead-
ing world economies. High military expenditures in these countries en-
sure the technological development of dual-use industries. For instance, it 
is practically impossible to separate economic indicators, the number of 
employees, and investment amount into civilian and military sectors in 
Boeing or Saab Group. 
At the same time, small countries, and, above all, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania do not have such experience. In the same way, they have lim-
ited experience of statehood in general. In these conditions, ensuring mil-
itary security according to the principle “that` s what I want” is a threat 
not only to the Baltic States but also paradoxically to all their neighbors. 
Economic and political instability in the 21st century easily crosses bor-
ders, which is why there is a question of ensuring any possible security, 
its limits and quality. 
For a long time after 1991, the Baltic Sea Region has been a territory 
of relative economic prosperity and political stability. The political 
course of the Baltic States implied limited cooperation with Russia. Fin-
land and Sweden were ready to act as partners in the integration of Russia 
into the European and world systems. The Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of Ministers implemented a num-
ber of programs to introduce best practices on a wide range of issues, 
from environment to local government. 
At the same time, both objective and subjective contradictions gradu-
ally accumulated. Russia's expectations for cooperation with Europe and 
Europe's expectations for cooperation with Russia are not the same. This 
mismatch was not a quick reaction to an event, it was more likely to be a 
trend. This question has been discussed in the modern research papers 
[1—5, etc.]. 
However, within the framework of this article, the issue of the Baltic 
States' role in the general context of the RU-EU relations seems to be 
more important. Meanwhile, the subject of this research is the militariza-
tion of the Eastern Baltic region, which began long before the events in 
Ukraine. The fact that "Political leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
have considered participation in the alliance as an important element of 
Euro-Atlantic solidarity which allows smaller — from all viewpoints — 
states claim their participation in the decision-making process on global 
issues" [6, p. 15] is quite obvious. 
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At the same time, "smaller — from all viewpoints — states" presup-
pose the imperative of a rigorous economic assessment of any political 
decisions. Ralph Norman Angell, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 
his program work "The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Mili-
tary Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage notes: 
"The success of smaller states is a fact that further demonstrates that 
wealth can be provided in addition to armament"[7, p. 40]. 
The militarization of the Baltic States occurs in the era of postmod-
ernism: "The distinctions between the political and the economic, the 
public and the private, the military and the civil are blurred. 
To introduce new coercive forms of economic exchange, political 
control is needed. A new, reactionary configuration of social relations is 
being set up, where the economy and violence are closely intertwined 
within the political paradigm” [8, p. 222]. It is noteworthy that the given 
processes are observed in many countries. However, this interrelation is 
more apparent in smaller countries. 
The hypothesis mentioned above needs certain argumentation. Con-
sequently, this research is aimed at identifying objective economic limita-
tions to the present day strategy for militarization in the Baltic States. 
Another goal of this study is to demonstrate that the sustainable social 
and economic development is impossible given the growing military 
spending and shrinking economic ties with Russia. 
The study also aims to prove that the present day model of military 
construction developed in the Baltic States after 2004 (joining NATO) 
and before the events in Ukraine (2014). 
As an additional task, it is presumed to prove that course on militari-
zation is not connected with events in Ukraine and is a part of Baltic 
States' political agenda. 
Moreover, the goal of this study is to assess the indirect impact of 
macroeconomic regional military spending. 
The hypothesis of the study, which was confirmed, was the expedien-
cy of analyzing military expenditures not as part of GDP, but as part of 
the revenue side of the budget. 
 
 
Baltic States: Dynamics of Military Capabilities  
and Their Economic Assessment 
 
Existing information indicates that the military spending in the Baltic 
States started increasing when they joined NATO. The Baltic Air Polic-
ing program was launched on March 30, 2004. The modernization of 
former Soviet airbase Zokniai, the biggest one in the Baltic States, cost 
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43 million euros [10]. Since April 2014, the Estonian air base Ämari has 
been involved in the Baltic Air Policing Mission. Four NATO fighters on 
a rotational basis have been deployed. This is former Soviet airbase 
Suurkül, for the modernization of which NATO has allocated 30 million 
Euros [11]. 
In 2012, the Baltic States’ expenditures on the Baltic Air Policing 
Mission’s support amounted to 2.2 million euros. In 2016 they went up to 
10 million Euros [12, 13]. It is important to mention that at this stage the 
infrastructure costs were covered not by the recipient countries, but di-
rectly from NATO budget. 
A former Soviet airfield Lielvārde, located in Latvia, has become an-
other major military infrastructural facility in the Baltic States. It under-
went a major modernization in 2007—2014 when NATO spent 45 mil-
lion euros [14]. Similarly, since 2015, the US Air Force planes have ar-
rived regularly in Ämari to support the Atlantic Resolve Operation within 
the frameworks of so-called Theater Security Package (TSP). It's about 
the F-15 Eagle fighter and the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft [15]. It 
should be pointed out, that the deployment of the F-16 Fighting Falcon 
multi-purpose fighters capable of carrying American tactical nuclear 
bombs means not only military-political risks but also the corresponding 
economic expenditures [16; 17]. 
Since 2015—2016, economic structure support has been provided by 
the Baltic States’ national budget. However, 6.5 million Euros for the fur-
ther modernization of Ämari airbase has been allocated. 
Since April 2014, NATO ground forces, mostly American, in addi-
tion to the air forces have become available. Thus, since February 2017 
to June 2017, the 1st Battalion of the 68th Armored Regiment of the 3rd 
Armored Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division (the 3rd bri-
gade group was transferred to Europe from the United States for nine 
months in early January 2017) was deployed in Rukla (Lithuania), Adazi 
(Latvia) and Tapa (Estonia) bases. The battalion accounts 628 soldiers 
and officers, 29 M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks (MBT) and 32 Bradley 
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) and Cavalry  Fighting Vehicles (CFV) 
[20, p. 101—102]. 
Maintaining this military infrastructure requires heavy funding in ac-
cordance with the standards of NATO. 
To speed up the American troops deploying in the Baltic Sea region, 
the depots for military equipment are constructed within the framework 
of the European Activity Set (EAS), which has been implemented by the 
USA since 2013. The first military depot was built in Lithuania in 2015. 
It houses nearly 200 military units and munitions (including M1A2 
Abrams MBTs and Bradley IFVs), which is enough to arm a company-
sized element. The same kind of storage depots was built in Lithuania 
and Estonia in 2017. As the result, every country of the Baltic Sea region 
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must have a set for equipping the US mechanized infantry company (14 
units of heavy armored vehicles (tanks and/or IFVs) plus light support 
vehicles) [9]. Taking into account weaponry and military equipment 
housed in Poland, all this would be enough to equip a combined battalion 
of the US land-forces [21]. 
At the NATO summit in Warsaw on July 8—9, 2016, it was decided 
to deploy four multinational tactical battalion groups to reinforce an ad-
vanced presence in Poland and three Baltic countries (one in each country). 
Their deployment began on January 24, 2017, and finished on June 19, the 
same year [22; 23]. 
Germany headed the battalion group in Rukla (Lithuania). The group 
also includes the military from Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, and 
Norway (the total number of the group is about 1,022 personnel). French 
armed forces (about 1,100 personnel) joined Great Britain battalion group 
of Tapa (Estonia). The troops from Spain, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, and 
Albania (about 1,138 personnel) joined the Latvian base group Adazhi, 
which was led by Canada. Thus, all the joined tactical battalion in the 
Baltic Sea region accounts for approximately 3,260 NATO troops, which 
roughly corresponds to the size of one brigade [24]. 
The deployment of additional troops and the increase in the number 
of own armed forces required the creation of additional military infra-
structure and the modernization of the existing one. For example, in 2016 
Latvia invested 23.5 million euros in the development of military infra-
structure, and by 2017—42 million euros [25]. In Lithuania, deployment 
of the NATO multinational battalion alone required an additional infra-
structure expenditure of about 5.8 million euros [26]. Estonia in 2016 al-
located 10.1 million euros for the development of infrastructure for 
NATO forces [27]. 
Expenditures of the Baltic countries and on the development of their 
armed forces have significantly increased, incl. arms purchases, including 
armored personnel carriers (APC) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), 
self-propelled guns (SPG), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), man-
portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), medium-range surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) systems, etc. (see for more details [28]). The equipment 
that is purchased has often been in use. An example of this was the pur-
chase of old British armored vehicles by Latvia for the amount of 249 mil-
lion euros, which brought about the scandal and investigation [29]. How-
ever, in some cases, the purchases are of some modern designs. For in-
stance, Lithuania has bought German Boxer APC, Norwegian-American 
NASAMS-2 mobile medium-range SAM system, American Javelin ATGM 
and Stinger MANPADS, Latvia — Swedish RBS 70 NG MANPADS 
and Israeli Spike-LR ATGM, Estonia — South Korean K9 Thunder long-
range self-propelled howitzers (together with Finland), Javelin ATGM 
and French Mistral-3MANPADS. 
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Given the economic aspect, a paradoxical situation arises. Infra-
structural support of obsolete military equipment requires more costs, 
which is connected with the specifics of the maintenance. Similarly, 
the heterogeneity of military equipment and equipment characteristic 
of the Baltic states creates not only organizational but also economic 
problems. 
Let's get down to the military-economic aspect of the problem in a 
more detailed way. The military needs of the state represent the totality of 
its economic needs, which are necessary for the material security of the 
country's military security, for the armed protection of its national inter-
ests. The greatest increase in military spending is typical for Central Eu-
ropean countries in 2016. In 2016 compared to 2015 military expendi-
tures grew mostly in Latvia (44 % to 267.86 million euros) and Lithuania 
(35 %, up to 575 million euros) [30]. 
According to the IHS Markit report, by 2020 the overall defense 
budgets of the three Baltic republics will reach $ 2.1 billion, which is 
twice the corresponding costs in 2004 when the countries joined NATO, 
and is the fastest growth of the "military" budget in comparison to any 
region of the world [31]. However, what is important is the extent to 
which the economies of the Baltic States can develop under such budget-
ary rules? 
The Baltic countries certainly have a strong potential for cooperation 
with Russia and could become a zone of contact between the West and 
Russia, but this does not happen. Moreover, according to expert esti-
mates, the disruption of economic ties with Russia results in 8—12 % of 
GDP losses in each of the Baltic states [32, p. 45]. 
The political decision to break the production chains adopted decades 
ago triggered the transformation of economic policy in the Baltic States 
and Russia. However, the interdependence in transit and logistics has 
proved to be stronger than economists and politicians assumed. The EU 
reforms and the new budget cycle (2020) are accompanied by a change in 
the model of financial planning, a reduction in budget subsidies to Euro-
pean states. Brexit also means a change in the model of financial relations 
between Brussels and the Baltic states. 
Budget planning in these conditions is based on planning "from what 
has been achieved" and involves the analysis of expected change in both 
expenditures and revenues. It is unacceptable to adjust the projected 
budget figures according to the political decisions of simply advisory na-
ture. 
Under these conditions, disrupted economic ties with Russia mean 
losses of 3—5 % of GDP or at least 10 % of the budget revenue. 
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Military Expenditures versus Balanced Development:  
Traditional and New Approaches 
 
Studies of the impact of military spending on the economy have had a 
long history. As it was written more than 60 years ago, "for the American 
people, of course, there is nothing new in the idea of ensuring the pros-
perity of the economy through spending on weapons" [33, p. 3]. Ameri-
can approaches to the economic analysis of military spending are very 
complex, their improvement is rightly associated with the post-war peri-
od [34]. 
Recognizing that the defense sector is potentially one of the most 
technologically advanced in the national economy in countries with high 
military expenditures, “the defense can hardly be denied as an inherent 
driving force for diversifying the market economy”. 
For this, double-use technologies are used, partnerships of state com-
panies with commercial enterprises are formed to fulfil defense needs. 
The process was named as the "spiral development" method and the "spi-
ral acquisition of weapons" principle, suggesting a reduced transition 
time to new technologies with the progressive build-up of necessary 
knowledge. It was assumed that these measures should not only promote 
the expansion of possibilities to bring down the cost of creating military 
equipment, but also enhance the activity of the technological transfer [36, 
p. 27]. 
Providing a source of demand for new technologies that do not yet 
have a niche in the market, military spending provides an important im-
petus for research and development, which affects more broadly innova-
tion in general. Therefore, it is not surprising, according to researchers 
(including Dan Steinbock), that during the Cold War, defense R & D was 
a key "contributor" to national growth through large-scale development 
of important general-purpose technologies [37]. 
On the other hand, there is another point of view, suggesting that 
"high defense spending, security and pensions take money that could be 
invested in human and physical capital" [38, p. 6]. The authors believe 
that the growth of military spending and the growth of the military secu-
rity component for the Baltic states lead to other economic consequences 
than for Sweden, the US or Russia. 
There are some systemic economic signs of this situation. 
Firstly, the increase in military spending causes a reduction in other 
national spending. This is guaranteed for infrastructure and health care 
costs. 
Secondly, most of the expenses of wartime are formed even before 
the military conflict begins. For instance, the country strives for a steadi-
ly high level of military spending. However, political risks cause capital 
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outflow. Economic policy, political institutions, and political freedoms 
continue to deteriorate in the situation of growing of military threats, ei-
ther imaginary or real once. 
Even in case of a fairly successful economic development (e. g., Esto-
nia), there is still an unresolved question how the economic indicators 
would be compared to the military spending of Germany (1.2 %). In other 
words, can Lithuania afford to double its military spending, twice as high 
as those of Germany if the economy of the latter is 40—45 times as big? 
Large-scale economic growth is necessary to avoid this trap, but in the 
Baltic states it is impossible because of external and internal factors. An 
additional 2.2 % of GDP military spending during a seven-year period 
leads to a permanent loss of about 2 % of GDP [39]. 
Thirdly, the economic expenses of militarization are prolonged at 
least for the medium term. The chairman of fraction «Consent» in the 
Latvian Saeima (parliament) Janis Urbanovich named the state budget of 
2017 a front-line one. According to the parliamentarian, the country is 
allegedly preparing to repel an attack from the east. 
"Russia is not an enemy of Latvia. Enemies of Latvia are inner ones 
such as poverty, stupidity, weak health care and education systems”, Ur-
banovich emphasized [40]. The number of local economic projects, which 
will be slowed down, still grows. "I think, because of the preparation for 
war, no one is ready to invest in the military," said OU Navesco (Esto-
nia), a member of Tõnis Seesmaa in August, 2016 [41]. 
The aforementioned reason represent the real macroeconomic pro-
spects of the national economies of the Baltic states. Existing mathemati-
cal approaches do not allow to unequivocally evaluate the impact of mili-
tary spending on economic growth. This conclusion, which is based on 
the analysis of quantitative studies using mathematical models (mainly 
econometric methods and factorial analysis), is presented in the forth-
coming study [42]. 
This situation was evaluated by other experts and we totally agree 
with their conclusions. “Numerous studies have neither convincingly 
supported the opinion of the negative impact of military spending on 
economic growth, nor have they refuted the hypothesis about a positive 
interdependence between defense spending and economic growth” [43, 
с. 27, 44]. 
The correlation between military and economic development priori-
ties is not probably new in social and political sciences, and it has been 
discussed for a long time. Quantitative research methods, so popular in 
the 20th and especially 21st century, certainly contributed to the analysis 
of this issue. However, until now there has been no clear understanding 
of how to ensure a balanced economic development in the conditions of 
real or hypothetical military risks. There are different points of view on 
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the impact of increasing military spending on the national economy. This 
issue which has been repeatedly analyzed for developed European coun-
tries, the USA, the Soviet Union, China, is now becoming more acute 
also for the Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. These countries try 
to revitalize an old discussion about the consequences of increasing mili-
tary spending. 
 
 
Military Spending:  
Economic Consequences for Smaller Countries 
 
There is a traditional question: to which extent does military spending 
facilitate economic development? Does it enhance or hamper it? The an-
swer is obvious for leading economies. For us, it is more important to as-
sess the consequences of mobilizing technical and military capacities in 
smaller countries. 
From our point of view, there is no definite answer to this question. 
Moreover, when analyzing the Baltic Sea region, the scale effect proves 
to be particularly important. In other words, the quantitative and qualita-
tive indicators of the economic development of Germany and Sweden 
cannot be compared directly with that of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
In Germany and Sweden military construction contributes to the modern-
ization of the existing infrastructure, stimulates the construction industry, 
and has a positive effect on certain service sectors, especially public ca-
tering. However, as for the Baltic States, military spending leads to an 
increase in innovation activity, development of high tech, including dual-
purpose technologies, but not in every country. 
Investing in the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Sweden or 
Germany is cost-effective since in the vast majority of cases the money is 
spent on dual-purpose technologies. As for the Baltic States, the situation 
is quite different. The Estonian robotic caterpillar tracks designed by 
MILREM and presented at the UMEX-2016 International Exhibition in 
Abu Dhabi are used for military purposes only. However, the develop-
ment of this and other systems required enormous investment, too heavy 
a burden for Estonia’s national economy. 
The certification and compliance of these products with the NATO 
standards is a technological and, consequently, an economic problem. It 
is even more expensive than producing military equipment and the pro-
duction cost per unit is very high. This problem does not exist in Germa-
ny. Germany’s military spending is relatively low, but still the country 
has a well- developed military industry: its military export volume ranks 
fourth in the world. However, if Germany meets the NATO requirement 
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to invest 2 % of its GDP in defense, then, according to some estimates, 
the country will have needed a budget which exceeds the present budget 
1.2 % (75 bln) by 2024 [45]. 
In 2016, Latvia's military budget amounted to 280 million US dollars 
[46]. Investing heavily in research and development, Germany and even 
politically neutral Sweden benefit greatly in many spheres. These coun-
tries develop dual-use technologies penetrating new markets. Politically 
neutral Sweden is a smaller country but it provides a wide range of mili-
tary supplies to the NATO. However, this exception confirms the rule: 
modern high-tech production demands an appropriate system of staff 
training, whereas the absence of such production requires a completely 
different system of professional education [47]. 
The share of military spending in GDP is calculated as the aggregate 
of armament, military personnel сosts, depreciation of fixed capital (bar-
racks, structures, etc.) and operating costs. Let us explain it using an ex-
ample. If Sweden adopts the Strf 9040 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) 
manufactured by NV Utveckling AB, then it will be manufactured and 
maintained in Sweden which is beneficial for the national economy. That 
is why Sweden pays a different price for the Strf 9040 vehicle compared 
to Poland, which imports this IFV. 
It is more complicated to calculate military spending taking into ac-
count dual-use infrastructure costs and expenditures related to it. How is 
it possible to assess one-off NATO payments? To which extent can they 
compensate for defense spending? According to the Ministry of Defense 
of Latvia, the country will have received 71 million euros from NATO by 
2021. The funds received are planned to be used for the development of 
the country's military infrastructure, as well as for the deployment of the 
Allied troops that arrived in Latvia in 2017. Earlier, Latvian authorities 
announced the plans to meet one of the NATO requirements to allocate 
no less than 2 % of GDP for military expenditures. As of today, 2 % of 
GDP of Latvia will account for approximately 600 million US dollars a 
year, i. e. it will have doubled. Taking into account the fact that Latvia's 
national debt has increased from 1.5 billion to 9.5 billion euros [which is 
a one-year national budget of the country] during the last ten years [48], 
such a policy may lead to a loss of control over the key macroeconomic 
processes. 
There is an even more difficult problem — the estimation of indirect 
losses. One of the world's largest insurance companies, American Inter-
national Group (AIG), set up in Vilnius in 2015, decided to relocate its 
service centre and move it away from the Lithuanian capital in 2017. In 
2016, the same decision was made by the manufacturer of soft drinks 
Coca-Cola and the manufacturer of chips Estrella [49]. The situation is 
similar in Estonia: instead of the planned investment in Estonia, Apple, 
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an American multinational technology company, will invest in Denmark 
and Ireland [50]. There are several reasons for it: high electric energy 
costs in Estonia and the country’s close proximity to Russia. 
The focus is always on the military threat: on the one hand, it attracts 
military investment, but on the other hand, it deprives the country of the 
majority of long-term investments in the economy and, especially, social 
capital. Tactical benefits from dual-use infrastructure in the conditions of 
the destruction of social infrastructure cannot be compensated. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we note the necessity to adjust the basic methodology. 
We see it as incorrect to relate military spending calculation to GDP. The 
share of military expenditures should be compared to budget revenues. 
For instance, in Estonia, the state budget revenues in 2017 accounted for 
9.42 billion euros. Defense spending for the first time grew up to 2.18 % 
of GDP — almost 500 million euros. In addition, all the expenditures re-
quiring the Allies presence in Estonia, including investments in the mili-
tary town of Tapa, will be financed. Moreover, the funds of the defense 
investment program for 2018—2020 will be used in the total amount of 
60 million euros and also the construction of the eastern border will con-
tinue [51]. Thus, 560 million euros are to be calculated out of 9.42 billion 
euros. In our case, open military expenditures on budget items amount to 
almost 6.0 % of the budget revenue. A similar situation is typical for Lat-
via and especially Lithuania. 
Given the above-mentioned analysis, three scenarios of the political 
situation in the Baltic States and Russian-Baltic relations can be identi-
fied [52]. Relating to the topic of this article, the strategy of managed 
conflict and direct local conflict bring the same outcome which is the de-
struction of the economy and political instability. Only peaceful coexist-
ence and cessation of militarization in the Baltic region will contribute to 
the economic development of both the Baltic States and Russia. 
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